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Abstract. There is an increasing need for today’s autonomous systems
to collaborate in real-time over wireless networks. These systems need to
interact closely with other autonomous systems and function under tight
timing and control constraints. This paper concerns with the modeling
and quality assurance of the timing behavior of such network embedded
systems. It builds upon our previous work on run-time model checking of
temporal correctness properties and automatic white-box testing using
run-time assertion checking. This paper presents an architecture for the
network embedded systems, a lightweight formal method that is based
on formal statechart assertions for the design and development of net-
worked embedded systems, and a process of using run-time monitoring
and verification, in tandem with modeling and simulation, to study the
timing requirements of complex systems early in the design process.
Keywords: Network Embedded System, Lightweight Formal Method,
Architecture Design, Run-Time Verification, Statechart Assertions.
1 Introduction
With the recent advance in Internet and wireless technology, there is a new de-
mand for high performance and intelligent automobiles, aircraft and autonomous
robots to collaborate in real-time over wireless networks. These systems need to
interact closely with other embedded systems and function under tight tim-
ing and control constraints. This paper addresses the need to verify the tim-
ing properties of real-time, reactive distributed systems. It presents a testing
methodology that builds upon our work on run-time model checking of temporal
correctness properties and automatic white-box testing using run-time assertion
checking [4]. Run-time Execution Monitoring of formal specification assertions
(REM) is a class of methods for tracking the temporal behavior, often in the
F. Kordon and J. Sztipanovits (Eds.): Monterey Workshop 2005, LNCS 4322, pp. 281–303, 2007.
c© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007
282 M.-T. Shing and D. Drusinsky
form of formal specification assertions, of an underlying application. REM meth-
ods range from simple print-statement logging methods to run-time tracking of
complex formal requirements (e.g., written in temporal logic or as statechart as-
sertions) for verification purposes. NASA used REM for the verification of flight
code for the Deep Impact project [10]. In [8], we showed that the use of run-time
monitoring and verification of temporal assertions, in tandem with rapid pro-
totyping, helps debug the requirements and identify errors earlier in the design
process. Recently, REM has been adopted by the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense
System project as the primary verification method for the new BMDS battle
manager because of its ability to scale, and its support for temporal assertions
that include real-time and time series constraints [2].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
the StateRover statechart assertion formalism. Section 3 presents an architecture
that supports high-level specification of network level objectives and policies
and the enforcement of these policies by direct re-configuration of the states of
individual network elements. We will illustrate the proposed architecture with
an example from the automatic highway platoon system. Section 4 describes
the use of run-time monitoring and verification, in tandem with modeling and
simulation, to study the timing requirements of complex systems early in the
design process. Section 5 presents a discussion on the approach and Section 6
draws some conclusions.
2 The Statechart Assertions
Harel Statecharts [15] are commonly used in the design analysis phase of an
object oriented UML based design methodology to specify the dynamic behavior
of complex reactive systems. In [5] [6], Drusinsky presented a new formalism
that combines UML-based prototyping, UML-based formal specifications, run-
time monitoring, and execution-based model checking. The new formalism is
supported by StateRover, a commercially available tool from the Time Rover Inc.
StateRover provides support for design entry, code generation, and visual debug
animation for UML statecharts combined with flowcharts. The new formalism
and tool allow system designers to embed deterministic and non-deterministic
statechart assertions in statechart designs and execute the assertions in tandem
with their primary UML statechart to provide run-time monitoring and run-time
recovery from assertion failures.
2.1 A Statechart Example
Figure 1 shows the top-level statechart of a leader election (LE ) module, which
is one of the many leader election modules connected by a unidirectional ring
network. The top-level statechart consists of three states, the Initializing state
and two composite states named Electing Leader and Found Leader, together
with a set of state variables declared in the associated local variable declaration
box shown in Figure 1. Each LE module uses the Own Id variable to store its
unique integer identity and uses the Leader Id variable to remember the identity






                       new TRTimeoutATGTime(20, this);
TRTimeoutATGTime watchdogTimer3 =
                       new TRTimeoutATGTime(20, this);
TRTimeoutATGTime heartbeatTimer =

















Fig. 1. Top-level page of the LE statechart

Fig. 2. The Electing Leader statechart of the LE module
of the current leader, which is the largest identity value among the identities of
all the active LE modules in the network. In addition, it has three timers and
an agent object. The timers are instances of a built-in StateRover timer class,
and the agent object serves as a proxy for all network communications.
The LE statechart starts at the Initializing state waiting for the arrival of
the start() event from the environment. Upon receiving the start() event, it uses
the send election() method of its agent object to send an election() message
to its neighbor in the network and then enters the Electing Leader composite
state shown in Figure 2. The Electing Leader composite state consists of two
concurrent threads, Electing and Watchdog 2. The statechart in the Electing
thread models the logic of the following simple leader election algorithm.






























Fig. 3. The Found Leader statechart of the LE module
if (event == election(id)) then // on-going election
{
if (id == Own_Id) then
send leader(Own_Id} event to its neighbor;
else if (id < Own_Id) then
send election(Own_Id) event to its neighbor;
else
send election(id) event to its neighbor;
}
else if (event == leader(id)) then
{ // found leader, terminate election
Leader_Id = id;
if (Leader_Id != Own_Id) then
send leader(id) event to its neighbor;
reset the watchdogTimer_2 timer;
transition to the Found_Leader state via the page connector C1;
}
The statechart in the Watchdog 2 thread makes sure that the LE statechart
receives at least one election() message every 60-second cycle while it is partici-
pating in an on-going election. If the LE statechart receives the event timeout-
Fire(timer) with timer == watchdog2Timer while it is in the Watching 2 state,
it will initiate another round of leader election by sending an election(Own Id)
message to its neighbor because it has not received any election() message within
the last cycle.
The leader election algorithm terminates when the LE statechart receives a
leader(id) message, and will transition from the Electing Leader state to the
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Found Leader state via the page connector C1. Note that the correctness of
the algorithm relies on a reliable and fully trusted network of cooperating LE
modules.
Figure 3 shows the statechart of the Found Leader composite state. It consists
of three concurrent threads. While in the Found Leader state, the leader uses the
statechart in the GenerateHeartBeat thread to send out a heartbeat(Own Id) mes-
sage once every 60 seconds, and each LE statechart expects to receive at least one
heartbeat() message from the leader via its neighbor in every 60-second cycle. If
the LE statechart receives the event timeoutFire(timer) with timer == watch-
dog3Timer while it is in the Watching 3 state, it will initiate another round of
leader election by sending an election(Own Id) message to its neighbor and tran-
sitioning to the Electing Leader state because it has not received any heartbeat()
messagewithin the last cycle.OtherLE moduleswill also enter theElecting Leader
state via the page connector C2 when they receive the election() messages from
their neighbors in the network while they are in the Found Leader state.
2.2 Statechart Assertions
Studies have suggested that the process of specifying requirements formally en-
ables developers to gain a deeper understanding of the system being specified,
and to uncover requirements flaws, inconsistencies, ambiguities and incomplete-
nesses [11]. The StateRover uses deterministic and non-deterministic statecharts
for the formal specification of temporal correctness properties (i.e. properties
about the correct ordering, sequencing, and timing of events and responses).
Figure 4 contains three statechart assertions for the following natural language
requirements:
Assertion 1. Leader Id must be greater than or equal to Own Id whenever the
LE statechart enters the Found Leader state.
Assertion 2. At least one heartbeat occurs every 60 seconds while LE is in the
Found Leader state.
Assertion 3. There should not be 3 or more rounds of leader election within a
5-minute interval.
Assertion 1 is an example of a correctness-property assertion that ensures “the
leader election algorithm correctly selects the active LE module with the largest
identity value as the leader”. Assertion 2 is an example of a timing constraint
assertion that ensures “the LE module receives at least one heartbeat every 60
seconds while it is in the Found Leader state”. Assertion 3 is an example of a
temporal constraint assertion to ensure the stability of the networked system.
Figures 5-6 show the combined LE statecharts with embedded statechart
assertions, where the Assertion1 and Assertion3 statecharts now become sub-
statecharts of the top-level LE statechart, and the Assertion2 statechart becomes
a sub-statechart of the Found Leader state. Sub-statecharts represent whole stat-
echarts defined elsewhere, i.e., in a different statechart file. Using sub-statecharts
facilitates reuse: the assertion statecharts are drawn once but can be reused many
times in many other statecharts. A statechart with an embedded substatechart
is called a primary statechart. StateRover provides a way to map the events
















on entry/bSuccess = false;
System.err.println("Assertion 2 failed!");
/*Local Variables*/
TRTimeoutATGTime assertion2Timer = 
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(c) Assertion3 Statechart 





























Fig. 5. The top-level page of the LE statechart with embedded assertion sub-
statecharts
































Fig. 6. The Found Leader statechart with embedded Assertion2
between the primary statechart and its sub-statecharts. The StateRover’s code
generator generates code that automatically passes down events from the pri-
mary statechart to the sub-statecharts.
Figures 4a and 4b are examples of deterministic statechart assertion. (Non-
deterministic assertions are discussed in Section 2.3.) Every time the Found
Leader state of the primary (i.e., LE ) statechart is entered, the Assertion2 state
is entered, and the sub-statechart becomes active, starting its computation in the
initial states (Init and Need heartbeat in Figure 4b). The sub-statechart remains
active until either assertion2Timer fires its timeout event and the Recording
thread is not in the OK state, or the LE statechart exits the Found Leader
state. Once the LE statechart leaves the Found Leader state, it is no longer in
the Assertion2 state and the assertion sub-statechart will not be executing at
all. The next time the LE statechart enters the Assertion2 state, the assertion
sub-statechart starts its computation from its initial states all over again.
The statecharts in Figure 4 are formal specifications that assert about the pri-
mary LE statechart because they each make a statement about the correctness
of the primary statechart. They do so using a built-in Boolean variable named
bSuccess, and a corresponding method called isSuccess(), both auto-generated
by the StateRover’s code generator. Whenever the assertion detects a violation of
the requirement it sets bSuccess = false, as in Figure 4b when assertion2Timer
fires its timeout event and the Recording thread is not in the OK state. The
method isSuccess() returns the value of bSuccess mainly for the purpose of JU-
nit testing and automatic white-box testing described in Section 2.5 and Section
2.6. Because statechart assertions are usually used to flag errors, the isSuccess(),
which monitors the bSuccess variable, is set to true by default. It is the assertion
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developers’ responsibility to set it to false when the assertion fails, as done in
the Error activity box in Figure 4b.
In addition, an unlabeled transition from the Assertion1 state to the Elect-
ing Leader state is added to enable run-time recovery (Figure 5). Whenever
the Assertion 1 fails, because Leader Id < Own Id, the sub-statechart reaches
the terminal state (T) and will therefore cause the unlabeled transition out of
the Assertion1 state to fire, forcing the LE statechart to transition to the Elect-
ing Leader state. Consequently, the LE statechart recovers from the specification
failure by starting another round of leader election.
2.3 Non-deterministic Assertion Statecharts
The StateRover supports the specification of more complex requirements us-
ing non-deterministic statecharts. Figures 4c is an example of non-deterministic
statechart assertions. While deterministic statechart assertions suffice for the
specification of many requirements, theoretical results [7] show that non-deter-
ministic statecharts are exponentially more succinct than deterministic Harel
Statecharts. As indicated in Figure 4c, there is an apparent next-state conflict
when event primaryEntered(“Electing Leader”) is sensed while the statechart
is in the Init state. The vanilla StateRover code generator (described in the
next section) generates an error message for such a statechart. It is however a
legal non-deterministic statechart. Non-deterministic statecharts use a special
StateRover code generator that creates a plurality of state-configuration objects,
one per possible computation in the assertion statechart. Non-deterministic stat-
echart assertions use an existential definition of the isSuccess() method, where
if there exists at least one state-configuration that detects an error (assigns
bSuccess=false) then isSuccess() for the entire non-deterministic assertion re-
turns false. Likewise, terminal state behavior is existential; if at least one state-
configuration is in a terminal state then the non-deterministic statechart asser-
tion wrapper considers itself to be in a terminal state. The StateRover also has
a power-user priority mechanism to change or limit the existential default def-
initions of isSuccess() and the terminal state. This mechanism is described in
details in [6].
2.4 The StateRover Code Generator
The primary StateRover rapid prototyping tool is its code generator. The State-
Rover’s code generator generates a class per statechart model (i.e. per statechart
file) in either Java or C++ language, a convenient level of encapsulation for a
controller statechart that lives within a heterogeneous system of Java or C++
objects created by various tools or perhaps hand-coded. The class can then be
dynamically instantiated according to the needs of the system.
In our example, we have four statechart diagram files, with the LE statechart
in the first file and the Assertion1, Assertion2 and Assertion3 sub-statecharts
in the second, third and the fourth files. The StateRover’s code generator au-
tomatically connects the four statecharts objects resulting in an executable LE
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module. The controller class consists of a set of event handlers (one per transi-
tion event), the central event dispatcher execTReventDispatcher, and the source
code for local variable declarations and methods supplied by the users via the
dialog boxes of StateRover’s statechart editor. In addition, the code generator
also generates a Java interface, named LEIF, to allow the test drivers or other
systems from the external environment to interact with the LE module.
Statechart orthogonality is implemented by the vanilla code generator using
a fixed schedule created during code generation. For example, in Figure 3, three
orthogonal timeoutFire() transitions, two in the WatchDog 3 thread and one
in the GenerateHeartbeat thread, will be realized as three if blocks within the
timeoutFire() event handler. The order of these if blocks induces a fixed firing
schedule for corresponding transitions. Besides the vanilla code generator, the
StateRover has a concurrent code generator that generates multi-threaded Java
code for statecharts with Harel-concurrence.
2.5 Testing of Generated Code
The generated code is designed to work with the JUnit Test Framework [1]
[18]. Use Case scenarios used by the system designers to identify user needs and
system requirements are hand-coded as JUnit test cases and exercised against
the generated statechart code. Figure 7 illustrates the StateRover’s JUnit based
testing architecture. Tests, which consist of sequences of events and timing infor-
mation, are either hand coded or auto-generated by the white-box test generator.
Fig. 7. JUnit based simulation and testing architecture
For example, the following hand-code test case describes a scenario in which
the LE statechart successfully participates in two rounds of leader election within
an interval of 180 seconds.
import junit.framework.*;
public class TestLE1 extends TestCase {
private LE veh = null;
private AGENT t = null;
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public TestLE1(String name) {
super(name);
}
protected void setUp() throws Exception {
super.setUp();
t = new AGENT();
veh = new LE(3, -1, t); // Own_Id == 3,
// Leader_Id == -1
}





public void testExecTReventDiapatcher() {
// first round of leader election
veh.start();
veh.election(4);
veh.incrTime(30); // advance clock by 30 sec
veh.leader(4); // found leader with id == 4
// veh should now be in the Found_Leader state
this.assertTrue(veh.isState("Found_Leader"));
veh.incrTime(120); // advance clock by 120 sec
// veh should initiate the second round of leader
// election since it has not received any
// heartbeat() for more than 60 sec
this.assertTrue(veh.isState("Electing_Leader"));
veh.election(1);
veh.incrTime(15); // advance clock by 15 sec
veh.election(3);
veh.incrTime(15); // advance clock by 15 sec
veh.leader(3); // found leader with id == 3
// veh should be in the Found_Leader state
this.assertTrue(veh.isState("Found_Leader"));
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A test exercises the primary statechart model, which then automatically ex-
ercises embedded assertions. The assertion feeds back a Boolean success value, is-
Success(), to the JUnit based test, which then announces fail or success
accordingly.
It is important to validate the correctness of the assertions early in the soft-
ware development process. By keeping each statechart assertion in a separate
diagram file, we can generate code and test each statechart assertion indepen-
dent of the prototype design. For example, a developer might expect the fol-
lowing scenario to cause the Assertion2 statechart to fail, since the heartbeats
do not arrive regularly; the inter-arrival time between the second and the third
heartbeat is more than 60 seconds.
public class TestAssertion2 extends TestCase {
private Assertion2 assert2 = null;
...
protected void setUp() throws Exception {
super.setUp();




public void testExecTReventDiapatcher() {
assert2.heartbeat(4); // receive first heartbeat
assert2.incrTime(61); // advance clock by 61 sec
assert2.heartbeat(4); // receive second heartbeat
assert2.incrTime(117); // advance clock by 117 sec
assert2.heartbeat(4); // receive third heartbeat
assert2.incrTime(10); // advance clock by 10 sec
assert2.heartbeat(4); // receive third heartbeat




The developer of the assertion was surprised by the assertion’s success for
this scenario. After a closer examination of the natural language assertion and
the Assertion2 statechart, the developer decided that the error was caused by
an incorrect interpretation of the natural language requirement “at least one
heartbeat occurs every 60 seconds”. Hence, he reformulated the natural language
requirement and the Assertion2 statechart as follows:
Assertion 2 (revised). The inter-arrival time between two consecutive heartbeats
cannot exceed 60 seconds.
When the extended primary statechart of Figure 6 (with the revised Assertion2
of Figure 8) is executed using a scenario similar to TestAssertion2, the revised
Assertion2 statechart will detect an error in the primary statechart as it is per-
forming REM of the primary. Automatic test generation discussed in Section 2.6
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Fig. 8. Revised Assertion2 statechart
is a technique for automatically discovering violating scenarios such as TestAsser-
tion2. This example highlights the subtleties in creating correct formal assertions
and the value of testing executable formal assertions via JUnit-based simulations.
2.6 Automatic, Intelligent, White-Box Test Generation
The StateRover’s White-Box Test Generator (WBTG) is an automatic code gen-
erator for a JUnit TestCase class. This TestCase, however, does not capture a sin-
gle, human created, scenario as JUnit TestCase objects usually do. Rather, it con-
tains a loop that creates a plurality of tests for a Statechart Under Test (SUT).
We denote this WBTG generated TestCase the WBTestCase. The auto-generated
WBTestCase is usable verbatim within a broader test suite that replaces the one
shown in Figure 7, which may include both WBTestCase and the manually cre-
ated tests. Automatically generated tests are used in three ways:
1. To search for severe programming errors, of the kind that induces a JUnit
error status, such as NullPointerException.
2. To identify tests that violate temporal assertions. Such failed assertion are
captured by a JUnit assertFalse() (versus the assertTrue()) statement using
the isSuccess() feedback loop depicted in Figure 7.1
3. To identify input sequences that lead the SUT to particular states of interest.
The StateRover generated WBTestCase creates sequences of events and con-
ditions for the SUT. The WBTestCase is intelligent in the following regard: it
creates only sequences which “matter” to either the SUT or to some assertion
statechart. For example, in Figure 1, upon startup, the SUT has one option only:
to observe the start event. The WBTestCase therefore generates this event. Con-
sequently, the SUT moves to the Electing Leader state shown in Figure 2. There,
the SUT expects a timeout event, an election event, or a leader event; so the
WBTestCase generates one of those using one of the two algorithms the user
1 To help statechart designers pinpoint specific errors, each failed test run is reported
with an identification number. The causes of failure for a specific run can be inves-
tigated in detail by running the automatic white box tester in single test/run mode.
Such mechanism helps developers to efficiently eliminate errors in their design.
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selects: the stochastic algorithm or the deterministic algorithm described below.
Hence, in general, the StateRover generated WBTestCase repeatedly observes all
events that potentially affect the SUT when it is in a given state configuration,
selects one of those events and fires the SUT using this event. The WBTestCase
auto-generates three artifacts:
1. Events, as described above.
2. Time advance increments, for the correct generation of timeoutFire events.
3. External data objects of the type that the statechart prototype refers to.
This process describes the model-based aspect of the StateRovers WBTG.
However, the StateRovers WBTG actually observes all entities, namely, the SUT
and all embedded assertions. It collects all possible events from all those entities,
thus creating a hybrid model-based and specification-based WBTG. For a SUT
with a loop, there is an infinite number of input sequences of unbounded lengths.
The StateRovers WBTG addresses these issues in the following manner:
1. The StateRover’s user specifies the maximal number of test sequences the
WBTestCase is allowed to generate, denoted as the WB test-budget.
2. The StateRover’s user specifies the maximal length of any test sequence
generated by the WBTestCase.
The WBTG uses two primary methods, a stochastic method and a deterministic
method, for test generation. For each of three artifacts of concern, namely, the
set of possible events, the set of objects the object factory can generate, and
simulation time increments, the stochastic method rolls the dice and makes a
selection accordingly, while the deterministic method attempts to systematically
cover all possible sequences by enumerating these artifacts and traversing new
sequences one by one. In addition, the StateRovers WBTG can also be configured
to use NASAs Java Pathfinder (JPF) [16]. JPF uses a customized Java Virtual
Machine to detect the presence of concurrency errors such as deadlock under
varying firing schedules of concurrent transitions and actions. Moreover, JPF can
be viewed as a sophisticated hybrid of the deterministic and stochastic methods.
JPF makes sure to not revisit system states more than once by recording the
state space being visited. The drawbacks of using JPF are: (1) JPF tends to run
out of memory for complex systems, (2) JPF wastes resources by model-checking
the assertions and the methods of the actions and activities, and (3) JPF does
not work well with frameworks like JUnit and Spring.
3 Adaptive Network Architecture
Any good architecture for the networked embedded systems must be adaptive
and easily reconfigurable at runtime to cope with the changing environment
and to accommodate changing mission needs. In particular, we must move away
from today’s box-centric network architecture where the decision-making logic
of the control plane is spread out over the routers and switches in support of the
simple best effort distributed protocol. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to
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Fig. 9. The 4D architecture (after [13])
retrofit this box-centric architecture to support the more sophisticated network
objectives like traffic engineering, survivability, security, and policy management,
which require the increasing run-time use of reflection (systems that utilize their
own models), self-adaptation, and self-optimization to satisfy the mission needs.
In [13], Greenberg et al proposed a novel clean slate 4D architecture that
abstracts the network management into four components – the data, discovery,
dissemination and decision planes (Figure 9). The decision plane replaces to-
day’s management plane. It consists of multiple servers (called decision elements)
that make all decisions driving the network-wide control based on the real-time
network-wide view coming from the discovery plane. The discovery plane is re-
sponsible for maintaining and updating information about the physical entities
making up the network and synthesizes the information into a network-wide
view for the decision elements. The data plane handles individual packets based
on the output (e.g. forwarding table, packet filters, link scheduling weights, etc.)
from the decision plane. The data plane may also collect data on behalf of the
discovery plane. The dissemination plane decouples the decision plane from the
discovery and data planes. It provides the option to move management infor-
mation from the decision plane to the data plane and state information from
the discovery plane to the decision plane using separate communication paths
to avoid the need to establish routing protocols before they can be used.
3.1 Network Architecture for the Automatic Highway Platoon
System
In this section, we will illustrate the 4D architecture with an example from
the automated highway system, where each vehicle is equipped with vehicle-
to-vehicle and vehicle-to-roadside Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) wire-
less communication, radars for measuring the inter-vehicle distances, sensors for
measuring the vehicle’s lateral position relative to the lane center, electronically
controlled steering, throttle and brake actuators, and the computers for pro-
cessing data from the sensors and generating commands to the actuators. In
addition, the roadway is instrumented with magnetic markers buried along the
centerline of each lane at four feet spacing. The magnetic markers enable the
vehicle to detect its lateral position, and by alternating the polarities of the mag-
netic markers, they can also transmit roadway characteristics such as upcoming
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road geometry information, milepost, entrances and exits information to the ve-
hicle [14]. The main objectives of the automated highway system are to reduce
traffic congestions, enhance safety, and reduce human stress. These goals can
be achieved using the Adapted Cruise Control technology [27], which uses sen-
sors to maintain a small but safe inter-vehicle distance between cars while they
traveling at high speed in the formation of a platoon [26]. These platoons are
coordinated using a leader-follower architecture that centralizes the coordination
on the leader [25].
In a centralized platoon, the task of communication to coordinate the vehicle
platoon formation is only executed by the leader vehicle. To maintain the platoon
formation, the leader (head vehicle) is the only entity that can give order (e.g.
velocity, inter-vehicle distance, time and location for lane change, etc.) to its
followers, while the followers can only apply the requested changes as well as
submit requests for leaving the platoon to the leader. The leader vehicle also has
to communicate with other platoons (which can be defaulted to a single vehicle)
to coordinate platoon merging as well as safe lane changes, and to communicate
with the roadside ITS for real-time traffic information and rules of engagements.
Finally, if the leader itself has to leave the platoon, then it must issue order
for the followers to select a new leader and hand over the command to the new
leader before leaving the platoon.
To support the complex communication requirements of the platoon leader,
we propose to apply the 4D architecture to the design of the automated highway
system communication network. Figure 10 shows the UML-RT model of the
high-level architecture of a vehicle for the automated highway system. UML-RT
[24] is an extension of the original UML based on the concepts in the ROOM
language [23], and forms the basis for the new features in UML 2.0 for modeling
large-scale software systems.
The UML-RT model shown in Figure 10 consists of a set of Vehicle capsules.
Each Vehicle capsule consists of a Planning capsule, a Coordination capsule,
a Vehicle Control capsule, a Comms capsule and a set of sensor capsules. The
Comms capsule, which represents the wireless communication subsystem of the
vehicle, is made up of a Decision Element capsule, a Dissemination Element cap-
sule, a Discovery Element capsule and one or more Data Element capsules (as
indicated by the multi-object icon). Each Decision Element capsule has two ports
to communicate with the Planning capsule and the Dissemination Element mod-
ule. Each Dissemination Element capsule has multiple ports for communication
with its associated Data Element capsules and uses single ports to communicate
with the Decision Element capsule and the Discovery Element capsule, as well
as forwarding management information from the Decision Element capsule of
the platoon leader to the Data Element capsule of the followers via the wireless
network in the Environment capsule.
Each vehicle’s Decision Element can be in one of the following 3 states –
active, voting or inactive. The Decision Elements will be in the voting state when
they are in the process of electing a platoon leader. Once selected, the decision
element of the platoon leader becomes active and is responsible for notifying the
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Fig. 10. The high-level architecture of a platoon vehicle
rest of the platoon about the election result. It will create the routing tables
for inter-platoon, intra-platoon, as well as vehicle-to-roadside communications,
and disseminate the intra-platoon routing table to the followers. The Decision
Elements of the other platoon members will become inactive and turn over the
control of its Dissemination, Discovery and Data Elements to the newly elected
leader.
With the help of the real-time network-view from the discovery plane, the
active Decision Element can quickly adapt to changes in the network environ-
ment while still maintaining the overall network objective. For example, when
communication degrades, the Decision Element can make decision, in real-time,
as to which messages should be sent first (via which data paths), which messages
should be delayed, or even not be sent at all.
4 Modeling, Simulation and Run-Time Verification
The analysis and design of complex safety-critical networked embedded systems
pose many challenges. Feasible timing and safety requirements for these systems
are difficult to formulate, understand, and meet without extensive prototyping.
Traditional timing analysis techniques are not effective in evaluating time-series
temporal behaviors (e.g. the maximum duration between consecutive missed
deadlines must be greater than 5 seconds). This kind of requirements can only
be evaluated through execution of the real-time systems or their prototypes.
Modeling and simulation holds the key to the rapid construction and evaluation
of prototypes early in the development process.
4.1 The OMNeT++ Model
OMNeT++, which stands for Objective Modular Network Testbed in C++, is an
object-oriented discrete event simulator primarily designed for the simulation
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of communication protocols, communication networks and traffic models, and
multi-processors and distributed systems models [20].
Figure 11 shows a simple OMNeT++ model of a platoon system with three
vehicles communicating with one another via the 4D architecture. OMNeT++
provides three principal constructs (modules, gates and connections) for model-
ing the structures of a target system. An OMNeT++ simulation model consists
of a set of modules communicating with each other via the sending and re-
ceiving of messages. Modules can be nested hierarchically. The atomic modules
are called simple modules; their code are written in C++ and executed as co-
routines on top of the OMNeT++ simulation kernel. Gates are the input and
output interfaces of the modules. Messages are sent out through output gates of
the sending module and arrive through input gates of the receiving module. In-
put and output gates are linked together via connections. Connections represent
the communication channels and can be assigned properties such as propagation
delay, bit error rate and data rate. Message can contain arbitrarily complex data
structures and can be sent either directly to their destination via a connection
or through a series of connections (called route).
4.2 Integrating StateRover Startchart Designs with OMNeT++
Models
Figure 12a shows an object model of the Decision Element Capsule package,
which is made up of a Decision Element class and the statechart classes generated
from one or more statechart files. Figure 12b shows an instance of the Decision

Fig. 11. The OMNeT++ model of an automated highway system
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
Fig. 12. The object model of the Decision Element Capsule package
Element Capsule package, which contains an instance of the Decision Element
class together with an instance of the LE statechart for leader election.
Here, the Decision Element class extends the OMNeT++ cSimpleModule class
and serves as the proxy (in place of the AGENT class) to handle as all network
communications for the statechart object.
OMNeT++ uses messages to represent events. Each event is represented by
an instance of the cMessage class or one its subclasses. Messages are sent from
one module to another – this means that the place where the “event will occur” is
the message’s destination module, and the model time when the event occurs is
the arrival time of the message. Events like “timeout expired” are implemented
by the module sending a message to itself. OMNeT++ cSimpleModule class
provides a virtual member function, handleMessage(), which will be called for
every message that arrives at the module. In our example shown in Figure 12b,
we will insert the following code into the handleMessage function of the Decision
Element module to handle incoming messages to the module:
void DecisionElement::handleMessage(cMessage *msg) {
if (msg->hasBitError()) {
// log error and update error count
}





// extract data from the message and invoke the




// extract data from the message and invoke the
// leader() function of the st object
st->leader(msg->getValue());
break;
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case HEARTBEAT_MSG:
// extract data from the message and invoke the
// heartbeat() function of the st object
st->heartbeat(msg->getValue());
break;
default: // unrecognized message kind





In addition, the Decision Element module provides three functions, send elec-
tion(int id), send leader(int id) and send heartbeat(int id) for the LE module to
send messages to the other LE modules in the network. When invoked by the
LE object, these functions will create an instance of the cMessage class with an
integer value set to id and the messageKind set to the appropriate kind, and




With the popularity of UML, Harel statecharts have become the tool of choice
for most engineers to design complex reactive systems. While statecharts can ef-
fectively specify what a system should do (positive information), they tend to be
less effective for the specification of safety requirements (i.e., negative information
about what a system must not do). Hence, researchers have attempted to augment
statechart specifications with other formalisms like process algebra [21], symbolic
timing diagrams [19] and temporal logic [12], and demonstrated formal proofs for
certain properties of the Statechart design. In the past, Temporal Logic [22] and
Metric Temporal [3] have been the two primary languages used by REM tools.
Some notable temporal-logic based tools are the Temporal Rover and DBRover
[4] and NASA’s PaX [17]. The major drawback of these approaches is that the as-
sertions are expressed in textual form, which are hard to create and understand.
The engineers need to work with two separate languages and formalisms, with as-
sertions written in temporal logic and system designs in statecharts, The lack of
a unified formalism requires users to work with two models, one for verification of
the assertions and one for specification of the design, with no guarantee that the
correctness of one implies the correctness of the other.
StateRover statecharts provide a coherent uniform formalism for both sys-
tem designs and requirements assertions. It is easier for system designers to
create and understand statechart assertions than text-based temporal assertions
because statechart assertions are visual, intuitive, and resemble statechart design
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models. For example, statechart assertions are event driven just like statechart
models, while temporal logic is purely propositional. Moreover, statechart as-
sertions are Turing equivalent and are therefore significantly more expressive
than temporal logic. While many commercial tools (e.g. Statemate, Rhapsody,
Rational Rose RealTime) provide the capability to generate target code from
statechart designs, StateRover supports the specification of and code generation
for non-deterministic statecharts, which is essential for the specification and
REM of more complex requirements.
Modeling and simulation plays a vital part in the development of network
systems. All prominent simulation tools (e.g., OPNET, OMNeT++, Ptolemy)
provide a rich set of reusable models to simulate various communication proto-
cols, network devices and links. The availability of these reusable models provide
cost-effective means to study the temporal and performance requirements of com-
plex networked systems via run-time monitoring and modeling and simulation
early in the development process. Most of these simulation tools support system
models that are made up of agents (i.e. black boxes) communicating via message
passing. This paper presents an architecture that wraps the StateRover gener-
ated code inside these black boxes (called modules) in the OMNeT++ models.
Similar architecture can be developed for the StateRover generated code to work
with OPNET and Ptolemy as well.
5.2 Reuse of Statechart Assertions
Reuse is one important reason for separating assertions from the statechart
model. Java interfaces are a convenient tool for separating components. The
StateRover uses two interfaces for primary-statechart/assertion-statechart sep-
aration: ITRPrimary is the interface for the primary statechart whereas ITR-
Assertion is the interface for the assertion statechart. The interfaces are ex-
tendible (being in source code form). This allows a primary to pass down custom
information to the assertion without the assertion “knowing” who the primary
is, and vise versa.
Event mapping is the simple mapping of event names from the primary stat-
echart name space to the assertion name space. While the Assertion2 statechart
uses the primary’s event name (heartbeat in Figure 4b), it could be written with
a generic event name such as P . A particular instance of this assertion inside
the LE primary would then map heartbeat to P using the StateRover tool. The
StateRover supports name mapping of assertion events to the primary statechart
event space and will generate code to implement such mapping.
In [9], we present a process for the development and evaluation of statechart
assertions early in the development process. The ability to test the statechart
assertions independent of the prototype design ensures that system designers
truly understand the required system behavior without being tainted by any
pre-conceived solutions. With the help of StateRover’s code generator, we can
create a library of executable assertion patterns consisting of generic statechart
assertions and the accompanying scenario-based test cases. The use of pre-tested
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generic statechart assertions will lessen the development time and improve the
quality of the statechart assertions in rapid prototyping.
6 Conclusions
This paper brings together several technologies (statechart assertion formalism,
run-time monitoring, discrete event simulations, JUNIT based test methodol-
ogy) to support the behavior modeling and run-time verification of complex
networked system temporal requirements. The novelty of the proposed approach
include: (1) writing formal specifications using statechart assertions, (2) JUnit-
based simulation and validation of statechart design and assertions, (3) auto-
matic, JUnit-based, white-box testing of statechart prototypes augmented with
statechart assertions, and (4) the use of discrete event simulation in tandem with
run-time verification for networked system prototypes. In addition, this paper
presents a clean-slate 4D architecture to support the complex communication
requirements of complex networked systems. To demonstrate the code design
described in Section 4.2, we have implemented a simple OMNeT++ model con-
sisting of 4 instances of the Decision Element capsule connected in a unidirec-
tional ring. Our next step is to develop a prototype for the highway automated
system shown in Figure 11, and test the timing behavior of the design with the
different platoon maneuver scenarios.
The StateRover Eclipse plugin is currently under development. This plugin
will enable the development as UML statechart models and diagrams under the
Eclipse IDE like any C++ or Java file. The StateRover will include support
for system-level UML modeling and specification. For the system-level modeling
view it will support component diagrams whereas the system-level verification
view will support a formal specification language based on message sequence
charts. The StateRover will include code generation and REM for both types of
diagrams.
Acknowledgments. The research reported in this article was funded in part
by a grant from the U.S. Missile Defense Agency. The views and conclusions
contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as nec-
essarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or
implied, of the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government is authorized to re-
produce and distribute reprints for Government purposes notwithstanding any
copyright annotations thereon.
References
1. Beck, K., Gamma, E.: Test infected: Programmers love writing tests. Java Report.
3(7) (1998) 37–50
2. Caffall, D., Cook, T., Drusinsky, D., Michael, J.B., Shing, M., Sklavounos, N.:
Formal Specification and Run-time Monitoring within the Ballistic Missile De-
fense Project. Tech. Report NPS-CS-05-007. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California (June 2005)
302 M.-T. Shing and D. Drusinsky
3. Chang, E., Pnueli, A., Manna, Z.: Compositional Verification of Real-Time Sys-
tems. Proc. 9th IEEE Symp. On Logic In Computer Science. (1994) 458–465
4. Drusinsky, D.: The Temporal Rover and ATG Rover. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Vol. 1885 (Proc. Spin2000 Workshop), Springer-Verlag, Berlin (2000) 323–
329
5. Drusinsky, D.: Semantics and Runtime Monitoring of TLCharts: Statechart Au-
tomata with Temporal Logic Conditioned Transitions. Proc. 4th Runtime Verifi-
cation Workshop (RV’04), Invited paper (2004)
6. Drusinsky, D.: Modeling and Verification Using UML Statecharts A Working
Guide to Reactive System Design, Runtime Monitoring and Execution-based Model
Checking. ISBN 0-7506-7949-2. Elsevier (2006)
7. Drusinsky, D., Harel, D.: On the power of bounded concurrency I: Finite Automata.
J. ACM. 41(3) (1994) 517–539
8. Drusinsky, D., Shing, M.: Verification of Timing Properties in Rapid System Pro-
totyping. Proc. 14th IEEE International Workshop in Rapid Systems Prototyping.
San Diego, California (June 9-11, 2003) 47–53
9. Drusinsky, D., Shing, M., Demir, K.: Creation and Validation of Embedded As-
sertion Statecharts. Proc. 17th IEEE International Workshop in Rapid Systems
Prototyping. Chania, Greece (June 14-16, 2006) 17–23
10. Drusinsky, D., Watney, G.: Applying run-time monitoring to the Deep-Impact
Fault Protection Engine. Proc. 28th NASA Goddard Software Engineering Work-
shop (Dec. 2003) 127–133
11. Easterbrook, S., Lutz, R., Covington, R., Kely, J., Ampo, Y., Hamilton, D.: Expe-
riences using lightweight formal methods for requirements modeling. IEEE Trans.
Software Engineering. 24(1) (Jan 1998) 4–11
12. Graw, G., Herrmann, P., Krumm, H.: Verification of UML-Based Real-Time Sys-
tem Design by Means of cTLA. Proc. 3rd IEEE International Symposium on
Object-Oriented Real-Time Distributed Computing (ISORC 2000) (15-17 March
2000) 86–95
13. Greenberg, A., Hjalmtysson, G., Maltz, D., Myers, A., Rexford, J., Xie, G., Yan,
H., Zhang, H.: A Clean Slate 4D Approach to Network Control and Management.
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review. 35(5) (2005) 41–54
14. Guldner, J., Patwardhan, S., Tan, H.S., Zhang, W.B.: Coding of Magnetic Markers
for Demonstration of Automated Highway Systems. Preprints of the Transporta-
tion Research Board Annual Meeting, Washington, DC (1997)
15. Harel, D.: A Visual Formalism for Complex Systems. Science of Computer Pro-
gramming. 8 (1987) 231–274
16. Havelund, K., Pressburger, T.: Model Checking Java Programs Using Java
PathFinder. International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer. 2(4)
(April 2000)
17. Havelund, K., Rosu, G.: An Overview of the Runtime Verification Tool Java
PathExplorer. Formal Methods in System Design. 24(2) (March 2004) 189–215
18. JUnit.org, http://www.junit.org/
19. Lu¨th, L., Niehaus, J., Peikenkamp, T.: HW/SW Co-synthesis using Statecharts and
Symbolic Timing Diagrams. Proc. 9th International Workshop on Rapid System
Prototyping. (3-5 June 1998) 212–217
20. OMNeT++ Discrete Event Simulation System. http://www.omnetpp.org/
21. Park, M.H., Bang, K.S., Choi, J.Y., Kang, I.: Equivalence Checking of Two State-
chart Specifications. Proc. 11the International Workshop on Rapid System Proto-
typing (21-23 June 2000) 46–51
Architectural Design, Behavior Modeling and Run-Time Verification 303
22. Pnueli, A.: The Temporal Logic of Programs. Proc.18th IEEE Symp. on Founda-
tions of Computer Science (1977) 46–57
23. Selic, B., Gullekson, G. and Ward, P.: Real-Time Object Oriented modeling. John
Wiley & Sons (1994)
24. Selic, B., Rumbaugh, J.: Using UML for Modeling Complex Real-Time
Systems. Unpublished white paper, Rational Software (Apr. 4, 1998)
http://www.rational.com/media/whitepapers/umlrt.pdf
25. Tsugawa, S., Kato, S., Tokuda, K., Matsui, T., Fujii, H.: A cooperative driving
system with automated vehicles and intervehicle communications in demo 2000.
Proc. IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Conference (2001) 918–923
26. Tan, H.S., Rajamani, R., Zhang, W.B.: Demonstration of an Automated Highway
Platoon System. Proc. American Control Conference. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
(June 1998) 1823–1827.
27. Xu, Q., Hedrick K., Sengupta R., VanderWerf J.: Effects of vehicle-
vehicle/roadside-vehicle communication on adaptive cruise controlled highway sys-
tems. Proc. 56th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference. 2 (2002) 1249-1253
